6 July 1944
War at Sea
German submarine U-678 sunk with all hands off Brighton
War in the Air
551 aircraft from RAF Bomber Command attack five V-weapon sites in the Pas-de-Calais. The raid was the last combat mission for Wing Commander Leonard Cheshire.
Churchill announces that 2,754 V-1 flying bombs have hit the UK, killing 2,752 people.
Soviet troops approach Vilna
Papandreou blames the EAM communists for disrupting Greek unity
6 July 1944 - History
Clown with bucket, Hartford Circus Fire, 1944 - Connecticut Historical Society
In the summer of 1944 the Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus set up its show in Hartford’s North End. On July 6, during an afternoon performance attended by almost 7,000 people, a fire broke out and spread through the Big Top. Called the worst disaster in Hartford’s history, the fire killed 168 and injured 487, including many children.
Smoke billowing from tent, Hartford Circus Fire, 1944 – Connecticut Historical Society
The fire began as a small flame and quickly spread to the canvas Big Top, which had been waterproofed with gasoline and paraffin, substances that made the Big Top vulnerable to fire. While many who died were burned to death, many others died as a result of the panic that spread throughout the big tent and were trampled. Several circus officials were charged with involuntary manslaughter, but the circus reached an agreement with Hartford officials and accepted full financial responsibility. They did not, however, accept responsibility for the fire and five men were charged and brought to trial four were convicted. Shortly after, all were pardoned.
The best-known victim of the tragedy was known as “Little Miss 1565.” Found after the fire, her body was never claimed although various individuals have tried to claim her over the years. She was buried without a name in Hartford’s Northwood Cemetery but was exhumed and reburied in the early s in Southampton, Massachusetts, after being identified as Eleanor Emily Cook. The identification of Little Miss 1565 is still debated. On July 6, 2005, a memorial to the victims was dedicated at the spot where the fire occurred.
This Week in History: 6-12 July 1944
Lt Rosine Crew: "Got to Do It" 42-102934 LN-W, for a mission July 11, 1944 to Munich-Damaged by flak over Munich, Lt Rosine returned with one engine out and force landed into a field near Little Bently after running out of gas. Crew was ok, plane was salvaged.
SITUATION: 100th Bomb Group, D+30 through D+36 (Missions #154-158)
Deadlock. That is the situation the Allies find themselves in during this week in history, as the map above depicts. The British attack on Caen from the East has failed as the 12 SS Panzer Division has firmly dug-in and is putting up fierce resistance. In the Cotentin peninsula, the American forces are also deadlocked with the German forces who continue to prove fierce in the defense, turning each hedgerow-lined field into a battle unto itself.
British and Canadian troops take the brunt of German reinforcements reaching the Normandy area, and they must fight for each yard gained. The German cost is high, however, as German war records show that the Germans have lost 80,783 soldiers between D-Day and 7 July. https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/battle-of-normandy/days/7-july-1944
General Eisenhower is impatient at the slow pace of the campaign and pressures his ground force commanders to request any/all air support that they need in order to break the deadlock. This order overwhelms General Pete Quesada’s tactical air force, however, and he moves to develop tactical air doctrine on-the-fly to meet the infantry’s growing appreciation and dependency on air power.
Meanwhile, the age-old argument over the “proper” use of strategic airpower continues to rear its ugly head as the bomber leaders fight to disengage from tactical support and focus, once again, on bombing German industry.
To make matters worse, poor weather throughout the week continues to hinder air operations and greatly reduces the accuracy of the bombers and fighters alike, often leading to instances of fratricide. Furthermore, the Germans learn to move only by night and to disperse their forces into well-entrenched defensive positions which minimizes any advantage tactical air power promises to provide.
It is under these circumstances that the 100th Bomb Group is sent into action. On 6 July, the 100th Bomb Group participates in a “No Ball” mission—the codeword for the destruction of Hitler’s powerful, long range V-2 rocket program which continues to terrorize London. On 7 July, the 100th participates in a 1,000 bomber raid that runs the gamut of target selection: 3 synthetic oil plants, 8 aircraft factories, 2 airfields, an equipment depot and 2 marshalling yards. On 8 July the 100th achieves “Excellent” results while bombing targets at Clamecy-Joigny and Bourth LeLente.
From 11-13 July, the Bloody Hundredth is let-loose on strategic targets once again in Munich which includes an aero-engine factory, an industrial area and a jet-engine plant. The 100th suffers the loss of 20 men and 2 aircraft on Mission # 159 against the jet-engine factory.
Will air power play a role in breaking the stalemate? Tune in next week for “The rest of the story!”
July 6: The Hartford Circus Fire
What began as an innocent day at the circus ended in one of the worst fire disasters in U.S. history, today in 1944.
In early July of that year, the Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus had set up one of their largest “Big Top” tents in a field in Hartford’s North End — a massive, 500-foot-long canvas tent that encompassed all three rings of the famous traveling circus and could seat up to 9,000 people. On the afternoon of July 6, an estimated crowd of 6,000 – 8,000 people, mostly women and children, were seated inside when flames were spotted in the southwest corner of the tent, twenty minutes into the show.
The source of the fire was likely a carelessly-discarded cigarette, but a perfect storm of circumstances converged to create a rapidly-spreading, hellish inferno. The tent itself was completely coated in paraffin wax that had been thinned with gasoline — a common method of waterproofing canvas at the time — which accelerated the spread of the fire so quickly it had completely consumed the massive tent in mere minutes. Several tent exits were partially blocked, creating a deadly bottleneck of panicked spectators inside the engulfed tent. Flaming chunks of paraffin-soaked canvas fell from the ceiling, severely burning anyone below.
Not even eight minutes after the first flames were spotted, the entire big top tent had collapsed. At least 167 people perished in the blaze, with several hundred more sustaining serious injuries ranging from burns to broken limbs. The next day, charges of involuntary manslaughter were brought against five employees of Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey, although no one was directly blamed for the start of the fire. The disaster made headlines across the country, and spurred numerous state and local lawmakers to enact stricter fire codes for buildings and public assemblies. To this day, the Hartford Circus Fire remains one of the deadliest human disasters in Connecticut history.
This aerial photo shows the aftermath of the Hartford Circus Fire of July 6, 1944. (Hartford Public Library)
Gwinnett County Health Fair, Kids Expo & Back to School Free Event
Join us Saturday, July 31st from 10am to 2pm for our Gwinnett Health Fair PLUS our ALL ABOUT KIDS EXPO/Back To School Event and School Supply Drive at Rhodes Jordan Park in Lawrenceville!
Admission is free so don’t miss out on this family fun event. The first 250 kids will receive a goody bag from Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta along with donated school supplies* and the first 100 adults will receive a goody bag from Clover Health!
There will be great vendors of interest to both Adults & Kids, kids’ activities, free healthcare screenings including blood pressure/hearing/HIV, LifeSouth BloodMobile will be on site, giveaways & door prizes and a school supply drive.
Watch for updates to sign up for special presentations including:
- Children’s Mental Health/Suicide Awareness & Prevention from GuideInc.org
- Vaping & Kids from GuideInc.org
- Interactive kids activities including Kids Improv activities from the Aurora Theatre
- Healthcare & wellness presentations & More!
Registration is not required but makes you eligible to win door prizes so REGISTER TODAY!
PLUS Every 3 non-perishable food items or School Supply Item donated gives you an entry to win prizes, including a gift basket from Belk Mall of Georgia valued at $300!
Full Schedule of Remaining 2021 Gwinnett County Health Fairs:
A US Marine in July 1944, looks at the bodies of Japanese soldiers killed during the battle for control of Saipan. Nearly the entire garrison of 30,000 Japanese troops died. For the Americans, the victory was the most costly to date in the Pacific War 2,949 were killed and were 10,464 wounded.
Casualty numbers incorrect: 3,426 US service members killed.
Thanks for your information. QA over the information posted to this community needs to be accurate and consistent.
The Wikipedia Saipan write up is inconsistent. The write up for the Wikipedia statistical summary box of the battle lists 3,426 KIA vs. the text content in the same write up lists 2,949 KIA. Upon further research the 2,949 KIA only represents enlisted men KIA. The Wikipedia text makes no distinction between enlisted personnel vs. officers. See the attached USMC Statistical Summary chart for the battle listing 2,949 enlisted KIA. Other sources list the same KIA totals, or totals closer to the number you reported for the Battle of Saipan. So your comment that US KIA on Saipan was 3,426 looks to be correct.
The Liberation of Majdanek
The Red Army's liberation of Majdanek in July 1944 was one of the most significant moments in the history of World War II and the Holocaust.
Above Image: Soviet soldiers inspect the ovens at Majdanek, July 1944. Courtesy of Deutsche Fotothek.
On the night of July 22-23, 1944, soldiers of the Red Army came upon Majdanek, the first of the Nazi camps to be liberated. They freed just under 500 prisoners and occupied the nearby city of Lublin on July 24. What Soviet and Polish researchers uncovered and documented behind the camp’s electrified barbed wire, soon reinforced by the investigative work conducted by others outside of the USSR, definitively shaped our understanding of the Nazi genocide. While still largely unfamiliar to most Americans, the liberation of Majdanek was one of the most significant moments in the history of World War II and the Holocaust.
Its name, taken from Majdan-Tatarski, a suburb of the major industrial center of Lublin, Majdanek had originally been envisioned by the SS as a key link in the colonization and exploitation of the General Government, the area of Poland under German occupation. Jewish soldiers in the Polish army, who had been taken prisoner, had been doing work in Lublin for the firm, the German Supply Establishment, since late 1940. In July 1941, a month after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler traveled to Lublin, for a meeting with Odilo Globocnik, the notorious SS and Police Leader in the region. Himmler made his intentions clear to Globocnik—establish a concentration camp near the city that could hold up to 50,000 inmates. They would work in SS economic enterprises for as long as they could endure. Poles, many of them political prisoners, Jews, and Soviet prisoners of war would constitute this unfree labor army.
In short, Majdanek began as a forced-labor operation, not as an extermination center, like the Operation Reinhard camps (Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor) that Himmler later ordered Globocnik to create. Construction of the site, which was never completely finished, started in October 1941, when 2,000 Soviet POWs were dragooned. The first Jewish inmates, literally grabbed off the streets of Lublin, set foot in Majdanek in mid-December of that year. Non-Jewish Poles arrived two months later.
In 1942-43, Majdanek transformed, however. As the Nazi mass annihilation of European Jews escalated, the SS installed gas chambers and crematoria there. Polish, Czech, Slovakian, and Hungarian Jews were deported directly or diverted to Majdanek because of overcrowding at other killing centers. The Nazis also transported Jews from Germany, France, and the Low Countries to the camp. In 1943, SS personnel at Majdanek murdered thousands from the Warsaw and Bialystok Ghettos in Poland after Himmler called for their liquidation. The camp’s “efficiency” increased as its usefulness to the “Final Solution” expanded.
Even within the culture of the SS, a culture defined by cruelty and contempt for the “other,” the staff at Majdanek gained a reputation for savagery.
Historian Doris Bergen describes how the SS contingent at Majdanek “were known as sadists who enjoyed killing children in front of their mothers and forcing the prisoners to engage in deadly ‘sports.’”
If the gas chambers were mainly reserved for Jewish victims, Poles and Soviet POWs were often executed in mass shootings or systematically worked or starved to death, if typhus epidemics did not claim them. Records show that the camp leadership utilized gas vans as well.
It was at Majdanek that the largest one-day episode of killing at a single site during the Shoah occurred. After the uprisings at the Treblinka and Sobibor extermination camps and the resistance offered by Jews in the Bialystok Ghetto, Himmler ordered the elimination of all Jews in the Lublin area. On November 3, 1943, as part of Operation Harvest Festival, the SS separated Jews from other inmates at Majdanek and machine-gunned them in trenches, forcing people to kneel on corpses as they shot them. Dance music blasted from loudspeakers played for hours to drown out the shots and screams. By the end of November 3, SS and police units had murdered 18,000 Jews. The massacre stands out even in the history of Nazi barbarity.
The collapse of the German war effort in the Soviet Union in the spring and early summer of 1944 threatened Majdanek. A combination of the rapid Soviet advance following Operation Bagration, launched on June 22, 1944, and SS incompetence meant that most of Majdanek’s infrastructure of murder remained intact when Soviet units seized the camp a month later. Posterity will be forever grateful for both the Red Army’s speed and the Nazis’ incompetence.
Immediately, Soviet and Polish researchers began the serious work of documentation. Though fault can certainly be found with aspects of this work, it is still extremely valuable. Moreover, looking through these initial investigations shows just how monumental a challenge it was to categorize what happened within the confines of Majdanek, a problem replicated when the Allies liberated other extermination camps, the concentration camps, and the killing centers for the disabled over the succeeding 10 months.
The Polish People’s Army’s Film Crew, under the direction of Aleksander Ford, created a powerful documentary about the camp. Released in 1944 and called Majdanek—The Cemetery of Europe, the film spares the reader little of the horror of the killing. The crew took shots of the excavations of mass graves and showed Majdanek’s piles of shoes, shoes that once belonged to real, flesh-and-blood human beings. Viewers can also lay eyes on the gas chambers and ovens and hear the testimony of liberated inmates removed from all over the European continent and sent to this hell. While the film says little about the special targeting of Jews—a major problem with much of the early Soviet and Communist coverage of the genocide, it is a landmark work in the history of Holocaust cinema and leaves deep imprints on viewers to this day.
Soviet journalist, Konstantin Simonov, struck a similar note when he authored a pamphlet, The Lublin Extermination Camp, in the summer of 1944. The pamphlet was quickly translated into many languages, including English. Reading Simonov exposes one to the fragility of human comprehension—how to find an adequate language and set of categories that can grasp the inhumanity and terror of a place like Majdanek. He introduces the text with a warning that there was so much more to learn about the camp and its operations, so many more witnesses to interview, and so many more of the dead to identify. “But having only this,” Simonov declares, “I cannot remain silent, I cannot wait. I want to speak at once, today, about the first traces of this crime that have been revealed, about what I have heard during the past few days, and what I have seen with my own eyes.” To edge his audience toward some limited understanding of what he saw, he lists the names of many of the murdered, names he extracted from a mountain of documents collected by the SS. “This frightful heap of documents was the grave mound of Europe, squeezed into one room.” Simonov notes how Jews and Soviet and Polish prisoners were among the earliest victims. He also records stories from witnesses about the horrors of November 3, 1943. The pamphlet then escorts the reader on a nightmarish journey through Majdanek, accompanied by photographs of the barbed wire and barracks, and, unforgettably, the crematoria surrounded by the charred remains of innumerable victims. If Simonov errs in the pamphlet in estimating the numbers of deaths in the camp at several hundred thousand (contemporary estimates range from 95,000 to 200,000), this is forgivable.
Konstantin Simonov. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Photograph #79145, Courtesy of Central State Archive of Documentary Film and Photography.
The works of Ford and Simonov were truly momentous. They grappled, visually and through the written word, with a genocide, before “genocide,” as a word and concept (it was only coined by Rafael Lemkin in 1944), really existed. For that matter “Holocaust,” the not uncontroversial term which has become the central designator for the annihilation of European Jews, had not yet emerged as an organizing concept either. Thus, the Red Army’s liberation of Majdanek and the vital research which followed soon thereafter should find a deeper place in our historical awareness of the Third Reich’s crimes. The camp’s discovery yielded irrefutable evidence of the Nazi extermination system and gave even greater impetus to the quest for justice for the victims comprising this “cemetery of Europe.”
Hellish History: Inside the Bloody 1944 Russian War Against Finland
It has been 75 years since 1944 and memorial events for the various decisive battles are held across the world. One of the largest and most grueling battles was the Soviet summer offensive against Finland. Here is a short article about this less known campaign.
The World War two had raged on for four years and the most pivotal moments of it had gone. German army was falling back on all fronts, Allied forces had landed to the shores of Normandy and the Soviet forces had dealt decisive blows to the German war machine.
While all this information was available at the headquarters of the Finnish army in Mikkeli, the Finnish army had grown complacent after spending the past two years in a stagnated trench warfare in the southern part of the frontline. The northern part of the front-lines had remained active, but the guerrilla warfare fought in the endless forests of the far north was worlds apart from the reality the war had evolved in the European theater.
Patrols raiding the convoys and forward outposts in the largest wilderness left in Europe did very little to prepare the Finnish soldiers for the modern war that unfolded in the plains of Ukraine and Russia.
The trenches that ran across the Karelia were built mostly in 1942 and the following years had been spent building up cozy accommodations and pretty headquarters for the regiments and divisions. Training was somewhat neglected and large numbers of tractors and horses were sent back from the stagnant front-lines to help plow the fields and rebuild the lands re-taken in 1941.
The Finnish intelligence was sending warnings about a possible major Soviet offensive all along the spring. Both the SIGINT and the reconnaissance sources pointed that the Red Army was moving experienced and well-equipped formations to the Karelian Isthmus west of Leningrad. At the same time the Finnish soldiers received dire warnings from their German colleagues that the way the Red Army fought had evolved into a massed use of armor and artillery that was nearly an unstoppable force of nature.
Finnish headquarters at all levels disregarded the information presented to them as it contradicted the “status quo”. While some units raised their readiness, the front lines were manned to hold the first line and beyond the armored and cavalry brigades, no one was prepared to fight a mobile war.
At the first light on the morning of the 9th of July the frontline at Valkeasaari-sector exploded, literally.
The Soviet high command Stavka had amassed the following force to breach the Finnish defenses between Leningrad and Viipuri:
- 14 tank and assault gun regiments
- Coastal batteries around Leningrad
- Naval artillery of the Baltic Fleet
These numbers meant that there were approximately 220 artillery pieces firing at every kilometer of the Finnish front line. On the first day the Finnish front-line was ground to dust with most of the trenches and bunkers destroyed by the over 80 000 artillery shells fired at them.
A village burning in the Karelian Isthmus
The first Russian assaults took the two of the most vulnerable positions and the Finnish 10th Division spent all its reserves in failed attempts to retake them. While the front-line held, troops were wavering under the immense pressure. The Finnish HQs failed to get a grip of the situation and administrative boundaries prevented the movement of reinforcements and ammunition stocks.
In the morning of the 10th of June the massive artillery barrage returned for two hours and after that three Soviet guards divisions supported by three tank regiments broke through the decimated Finnish 10th division. The resulting retreat border lined on panic and for example all of the divisions artillery pieces and anti-tank guns were lost, some without firing at all. While the front line broke and the lines of command collapsed, many Finnish units and individual soldiers fought valiantly, holding their positions till the bitter end.
Despite the shock and speed of the Soviet onslaught most civilians could be evacuated, but most had to leave with what they could carry.
The Finnish army managed to turn the flight into an organized delaying action and the Mikkeli HQ began to move all available forces to the Karelian isthmus. The armored division was one of the first units moved to stall the Soviet advance.
Despite named as the Armored Division, most of its infantry moved either on bicycles like these jaegers or on horseback as the Cavalry brigade with its dragoons and mounted jaegers was part of the division.
The Finnish army managed to man the secondary defense line, called the VT-line and the Russian offensive stalled. The Red Army managed to breach the VT-line too, but with the Finnish defenders, now fully reoriented to the new intensity of the war, managed to cause staggering casualties to the Soviet Guards Divisions at the spearhead of the assault. Stavka estimated that the Battle of Siiranmäki alone cost the Soviets over 20k men in casualties.
The battle raged on and Finnish army was forced to continue pulling back to a largely unprepared VKT-line. This meant that the Finnish forces had to abandon the nations third largest city Vyborg. While the loss Vyborg was rather minor in a military sense, it was a huge blow the public morale in Finland. It was also the only occasion that the Finnish BT-42 assault guns were used in combat. Fittingly the tank and the operation both were utter failures.
The Swedish speaking Finnish Infantry Regiment 61 was ordered to buy time for the defense and under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alpo Marttinen, who later on became a Colonel in the US Army. The regiment had received the first of the new German panzerfausts and panzerschrecks.
With well the help of the German Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey, a mixed detachment of JU-87D5 dive bombers and FW-190 A-6 and F-3/8 fighters, the now well-prepared Finnish artillery and the new weapons the regiment beat back a massive Soviet armored thrust at Tienhaara. Besides the Detachment Kuhlmey, Germany also sent the 303rd Sturmgeschütz brigade to help Finland.
This defeat led the Stavka to direct its main forces towards the village of Tali. Unlike the eastern part of the Karelian isthmus the area around Tali and Ihantala was more rugged with only narrow corridors that the Soviet heavy armor could effectively use.
The Finnish army had amassed it’s hardest hitting parts there. The defense was fluid, with troops pulling back and counterattacking synchronized with the artillery batteries gathered to support them. The advanced artillery fire control methods allowed the defenders to pinpoint up to 21 artillery batteries on a single target grid if needed. It was also possible for any of the forward observers in the front line, to call fire missions from any of the batteries in range regardless of the formal organization, or even without the knowledge of the type or location of the guns in question.
For example on July 2 the Finns intercepted a radio message that the 63rd Guards Rifle Division and 30th Armored Brigade were about to launch an attack on July 3 at 0400 hours. The following morning, two minutes before the supposed attack, 40 Finnish and 40 German bombers bombed the Soviet troops, and 250 guns fired a total of 4,000 artillery shells into the area of the Soviets. The Soviet attack never managed to leave its staging area.
All along the battlefield the Finnish reconnaissance teams operated within the Soviet formations, relaying movements and calling air and artillery strikes on vulnerable targets. This was made possible with the development of patrol radios for the guerrilla warfare up north and pre-positioned supply caches hidden in the area of operations.
The battle raged on until the 9th of July, when the Stavka decided that breaching the Finnish defenses with the forces available was impossible. And diverting the fresh reinforcements heading towards the German front lines to take on what was perceived as a secondary enemy, was deemed to be too risky.
By mid-1944 even the Red Army was scraping the bottoms of the barrel to man the infantry divisions.
The Red Army did attempt to bypass the Finnish defenses by taking over the islands at the Vyborg bay and attempting to open a bridgehead behind the Finnish forces, but those attempts were bashed back repeatedly. The island warfare was brutal and I’ve heard harrowing tales from my grandfather about the soldier returning from Teikari-Island and the Cavalry-brigades defense of the shore (He was a dragoon supporting a mg-squadron).
There are a few lessons that should be learned from these battles:
-Any static defense is breachable when there is enough artillery that can move and fire unimpeded.
6 July 1944 - History
On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of a bus in Montgomery, Alabama. But on July 6, 1944, Lieutenant Jack Roosevelt (“Jackie”) Robinson also refused to move to the back of the bus, and he received a court martial.
Jackie Robinson in military uniform, 1945
Jackie Robinson, later to become famous as the first black to integrate major league baseball in modern times, was assigned to Camp Hood near Waco, Texas during World War II. Camp Hood had a bad reputation among blacks, not only because of the segregation on the post but also because of the depth of racism in the neighboring towns.
On July 6, 1944, Robinson was riding a bus on the base and sitting next to a fellow officer’s light-skinned wife. The driver instructed Robinson to move to a seat farther back. Robinson argued with him, and when he got off at his stop, the bus dispatcher joined in the altercation. A crowd formed and military policemen arrived. The MPs took Robinson into the station. John Vernon, an archivist at the National Archives (Prologue, Spring 2008), tells what happened next:
“…when they arrived at the station to meet with the camp’s assistant provost marshal, a white MP ran up to the vehicle and excitedly inquired if they had ‘the nigger lieutenant’ with them. The utterance of this unexpected and especially offensive racial epithet served to set Robinson off and he threatened ‘to break in two’ anyone, whatever their rank or status, who employed that word.”
Robinson continued to show “disrespect” and received a court martial.
Robinson contacted the NAACP and sought publicity from the Negro press. He also wrote to the War Department. The white press picked up on the situation as Robinson was a well-known athlete from his days at UCLA. (In his time at UCLA, Robinson won a national championship in track and field, two consecutive conference scoring titles as a basketball player, was an honorable mention All-American in football, and also played a little baseball.) Higher ups were worried about this “political dynamite.”
At the court martial trial, Robinson’s commanding officer gave a glowing report on his character. His army-appointed defense attorney pointed out inconsistencies in witnesses’ accounts. The attorney also suggested that Robinson’s assertiveness was a legitimate expression of resentment given the racially hostile environment. Ultimately, the court acquitted Robinson of all charges.
While what happened to Robinson was not unique, the outcome of the conflict was unusual. It would more than another decade before blacks were free to sit where they chose on the bus.
For more information on Jackie Robinson’s army service, see the Prologue article, here.List of site sources >>>